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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
R-E-S-P-E-C-T 
Whatever else one might say about Russia’s diarchy, the essential grease that 
keeps the dual mechanism running smoothly has been a certain level of respect 
(if not always a consistent level).  Despite evidence of disagreements, 
differences in approaches on issues, or perhaps even pressure from their 
patronage tails to pursue a power war, Putin and Medvedev have maintained a 
certain cordiality and deference in relations that assuages concerns about 
political elite clan warfare.   
 
The foundation of the diarchy is a relationship that finds its expression in the 
mutual respect displayed.  As Putin remarked recently about Medvedev, “We are 
of one blood and common political views.” (2) While Putin chose Medvedev to 
succeed him (yes, yes – all duly confirmed by the electorate in 2008) and Putin 
continues to nod, if but formally, to Medvedev as president, it is, in fact 
Medvedev’s behavior that keeps the tandem in two-step.  From his earliest 
personnel appointments, to his visits with critical media outlets, to his war on 
state corruption, Medvedev had opportunities, and has been watched worldwide 
for indications that he might sidestep his former boss and assert his own political 
authority as president. 
 
Recently, Medvedev has been urged by Russia’s chattering classes to pursue an 
independent presidential policy, and Putin has been advised to stand aside and 
give Medvedev a chance to develop as a truly independent president. (2)  
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Last month the ability of Russia’s two heads to relate, really to chill, together was 
put on display at Sochi, as the president and prime minister relaxed at a café, 
walked along the water, and indulged in a photo op game of Badminton.  It does 
appear, however, that they well may have had an issue or two to iron out during 
this vacation break, and some analysts suggest that such a public display, after a 
long, dry spell between meetings of prime minister and president points to 
tandem tension. (3) 
 
So often, personnel issues pose the thorniest problems, and it seems likely that 
Putin and Medvedev had a few to discuss, including Kremlin concern over Putin 
pal and Rostekhnologii Head Sergei Chemezov who had been appointed to the 
Kremlin Commission on Modernization of the Economy.  Not long after his 
meeting with Putin, Medvedev dismissed Chemezov from the Kremlin 
commission.  Putative justifications for the removal of so close a Putin ally 
ranged from interclan warfare, concern over Chemezov’s business dealings 
(namely with AvtoVAZ), a Medvedev initiative to revamp the state corporation 
structure, and the most likely explanation, Chemezov’s lack of respect for the 
appointment and therefore the president. (4) 
 
Despite the lofty title of the president’s commission, Chemezov apparently had 
the mistaken impression that he simply had received another no-show job: 
“Chemezov was removed from the commission for insufficiently active work.”  It 
seems Vice Premier Sergei Sobyanin recommended Chemezov’s ouster 
because “[he] had not been to either of the two commission meetings (held on 18 
June and 22 July) and had not submitted a single proposal.” (5)  
 
Worse yet, the commission’s membership includes that Stakhanovite, Anatoli 
Chubais, who apparently went to extraordinary lengths—interrupting a trip to the 
US to catch a red eye back to Moscow for a commission meeting, then returning 
to the states to finish his business after the meeting ended—to demonstrate 
respect for the president and his commission on modernization.  (6)  Chemezov, 
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by not attending, failed to show proper respect – and that is an unacceptable, 
even dangerous, error. 
 
While Putin apparently took umbrage at his friend’s disrespectful behavior toward 
the president and his commission, Putin also has demonstrated that respect for 
Medvedev stops well short of Putin’s own political ambitions.  At this year’s 
Valdai Club meetings, Putin reportedly was asked (by the World Security 
Institute’s Nikolai Zlobin) about his plans for 2012.  While brushing aside 
concerns over a rivalry with Medvedev, Putin explained their collaborative 
approach to democratic succession: "When it comes to 2012, we'll work it out 
together, taking into account the current reality, our own plans, the shape of the 
political landscape, and the state of United Russia, the ruling party." (7)   Putin, of 
course, heads up United Russia. 
 
While Putin’s remarks seemed to knock the knees out of a Medvedev presidency 
by proposing to make his successor a lame duck with two years left in his term, 
Medvedev had some well-targeted analysis of his own, particularly on the ills of 
Russia’s developing democracy.  In an article, characterized as a Manifesto, 
Medvedev described the “baggage” that an unreformed Russia might carry: 
“Should we continue to drag into our future a primitive raw-materials-based 
economy, chronic corruption, and the inveterate habit of relying, in resolving 
problems, on the state, on abroad, on some "omnipotent doctrine," on whatever 
or whomever you like, only not on ourselves?”  (8) Inherent in Medvedev’s 
descriptions of the current state of Russia, is a stinging criticism of his 
predecessor, whose ten year rule is briefly noted to have helped stabilize some 
disintegrative trends, but nonetheless has left: “an inefficient economy, a semi-
Soviet social sphere, an immature democracy, negative demographic trends, an 
unstable Caucasus.” (9) 
 
Perhaps the shared vacation photo ops in Sochi were not quite as amiable as 
has been suggested.  
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Medvedev also released photos from his own vacation that seemed to mimic 
Putin’s earlier PR pics from his Siberian vacation.  Medvedev’s photographs lack 
Putin’s requisite shirtless shot, but then again, there are pictures of Medvedev’s 
wife, as they apparently vacationed together along the Volga. (10) 
 
Medvedev’s Kremlin website also has undergone some changes, both cosmetic 
and in tone.  Since the August meeting, the Kremlin.ru site has twice reported 
that Medvedev “issued instructions” to Putin, a phrase that seems not to have 
appeared before.  (11)  Medvedev also addressed the Valdai crowd on the 
subject of 2012:  “I do have a plan,”  Medvedev was quoted as saying, “But I'm 
not making any predictions.”  (12) 
 
With more than two years to go in Medvedev’s presidency, it seems decidedly 
premature to discuss the individual political plans of its diarchical duo.  Perhaps it 
is sufficient to note that a very strong element of competition appears to have 
invaded the relationship of prime minister and president.  It seems certain their 
respective clans will have noticed, too. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Putin might run for president in 2012 - political analysts,  
Interfax, 11 Sep 09; Johnson’s Russia List, 2009-#170 VIA 
http://www.cdi.org/russia/Johnson/2009-170-6.cfm. 
(2) Untitled interview by Boris Mezhuyev and Aleksandr Pavlov with Gleb 
Pavlovskiy, head of the Effective Policy Foundation, Kreml.org, 11 Aug 09 via 
JRL, 2009-#151, 17 Aug 09. 
(3) “Russia: Tensions seem set to continue despite tandem’s show of unity,” 10 
Sep 09; OSC US Open Source Center Analysis via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) 
2009-#169, 11 Sep 09. 
(4) See, for example, “Locomotives on Petrodollar Thrust,” by Maksim Blant, 
Yezhedenevnyy zhurnal, 14 Aug 09; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, 20 
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Aug 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic; “Change of the Fate,” by Nikolai Chekhovsky, 
7 Sep 09, Profil, No. 32; What the Papers Say (WPS) Weekly Review, 14 Sep 09 
via Lexis-Nexis Academic; and “Chemezov AWOL from Modernization by Mariya 
Tsvetkovna and Aleksei Levchenko, Gazeta.ru website, 5 Aug 09; BBC 
Monitoring Former Soviet Union-Political, 19 Aug 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(5) Chemezov AWOL, Gazeta.ru, Ibid. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) “Putin hints at presidential bid,” by Bridget Kendall, BBC World News, 11 Sep 
09, 23:02 GMT via http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8251856.stm. 
(8) Article by President of the Russian Federation 
Dmitriy Medvedev, "Forward, Russia!" Gazeta.ru, 10 Sep 09 via JRL, 11 Sep 09, 
2009-#169. 
(9) Ibid. 
10) Photos of Dmitry Medvedev and his wife Svetlana as they sail on the Volga 
River via http://www.daylife.com/photo/ 
0gSi2gR0Pn5tt?q=Dmitry+Medvedev. 
(11) “Russia: Tensions seem set to continue despite tandem’s show of unity,” 10 
Sep 09; OSC Open Source Center Analysis, Ibid. 
(12) Insight: Russia's leading men, By Bridget Kendall,  BBC News, 23:46 GMT, 




Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
It’s election season: Let the accusations begin 
The campaign season for next month’s Moscow City Duma elections officially 
begins this week, and as usual, with it comes a fresh batch of accusations of 
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government corruption and election misconduct. This year, however, some of the 
regime’s detractors are stepping away from direct accusations of fraud and are 
looking instead for other, more creative ways to discredit the government. The 
latest target is Yuri Luzhkov, member of United Russia and the Kremlin-backed 
mayor of Moscow, whose seventeen-year term in office has been questioned by 
Boris Nemtsov, an opposition politician and critic of the Putin government. 
 
Last Tuesday, former governor and deputy Prime Minister Nemtsov blamed 
Luzhkov for the persistent traffic problems that plague Moscow and its adjacent 
suburbs. He published a study claiming that these issues, which ostensibly stem 
from the city’s lack of sufficient infrastructure to handle the approximately ten 
million commuters that enter the city each day (doubling its population), persist 
because of “corruption and ties between road builders and authorities.” (1) 
Nemtsov’s main concern appears to be that these connections are stifling 
competition, which is driving up costs and slowing the pace of construction on a 
planned ring road, Moscow’s fourth, that would ease traffic congestion. 
 
The study further alleges that the new ring road will cost 7.5 billion rubles ($380 
million) per mile compared to the $4.8 - $9.6 million per mile in most European 
and American cities. Luzhkov’s office claims that the road is only expensive 
because the budget takes into account the need to demolish old residential areas 
near the construction site, but even after adjusting the price, the road still will cost 
approximately $334 million per mile. (2) The road is intended as part of a wide-
scale renovation and expansion of Moscow that Luzhkov’s administration has 
worked to execute in tandem with the federal government over the past several 
years. At the height of the oil-fueled economic boom of the first half of this 
decade, this construction reflected the prosperity and stability that the country 
was enjoying. Now, most of these plans have been shelved as the funding has 
been reallocated to social relief programs. (3) 
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Obviously, tales of corruption are nothing new in Russia, and Moscow is an 
especially easy target. A study conducted last September by Russia’s Public 
Opinion Foundation found that 42 percent of Muscovites admitted to bribing 
public officials at least once, making it the most corrupt city in Russia. (4) In 
general, Medvedev’s open war of words against corruption has done little to 
reverse the countrywide inclination to combat everyday inconveniences by 
throwing money at the problem. Even though the past year’s economic crisis 
greatly reduced the average citizen’s ability to spend, the amount of money paid 
in bribes actually has risen. Yuri Shalakov, the head of the Interior Ministry’s 
department for economic security announced last week that the average bribe 
has tripled over the past year to 27,000 rubles. (5) Bribery is not the only 
corruption-related financial crime on the rise; Shalakov’s department also noted a 
sharp increase in white-collar offenses such as money laundering and organized 
crime. 
 
The question remains, then, if corruption is so commonplace, why would 
Nemtsov focus his efforts on traffic congestion in Moscow? The answer may not 
have anything to do with the ill-fated fourth ring road. Rather, it is likely that 
Nemtsov is seeking political retribution after city officials recently prevented his 
supporters from participating in the upcoming Moscow City Duma election.  
 
Seven candidates from Nemtsov’s independent Solidarity party were rejected 
from the ballot, including Ilya Yashin, Ivan Starikov, Sergei Davidis, and Igor 
Drandin, who were removed after officials ruled that a significant portion of the 
signatures they had collected from supporters were invalid. Davidis was told that 
there were handwriting discrepancies between many of the signatures he 
collected and the dates, and many of Starikov’s supporters wrote ‘Moscow’ 
instead of their specific district. In both Yashin and Drandin’s cases, all of their 
signatures were rejected for what the local election commission called “gross 
violations and improper execution.” (6) Former Deputy Energy Minister Vladimir 
Milov, another of Solidarity’s erstwhile candidates, reported that 30 percent of the 
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signatures he had collected had been deemed false—including his own. (7) 
Yashin has challenged the commission’s ruling, but with the October 11 election 
less than a month away, it is unlikely that his complaints will have any effect on 
the now-closed nomination process. (8) 
 
This is not Solidarity’s first clash with the government over its ability to take part 
in the political process. After Nemtsov and Gary Kasparov co-founded Solidarity 
last December with the goal of uniting Russia’s various opposition forces, the 
party faced its first major challenge in March when Nemtsov attempted to run for 
Mayor of Sochi, home of the 2014 Winter Olympics. Nemtsov, who ran on an 
anti-Olympics platform, was never officially allowed to participate in the election 
and claimed that he was denied the local media coverage afforded to the United 
Russia candidate and eventual winner Anatoly Pakhomov. On March 23, youth 
activists from the Kremlin-backed youth movement Nashi strengthened his 
claims of corruption in the Russian government when they allegedly threw 
ammonia in Nemtsov’s face as he exited his campaign headquarters. (9) After 
hearing that the four Solidarity candidates had all been removed from 
consideration Nemtsov wrote in his blog that “if the cowardly and thriving regime 
thinks that in doing so it has won, it is deeply mistaken. The battle will continue. 
In the streets. Watch for developments.” (10) 
 
Other independent parties have faced similar challenges. Only one of four 
candidates representing Russia’s Right Cause Party (CPRF) was allowed to run, 
prompting party leader Leonid Gozman to call the campaign “a farce.” (11) The 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation, on the other hand, is in the election, 
but has found it nearly impossible to campaign. First deputy chairman of CPRF 
Ivan Melnikov accused the government last week of limiting the party’s ability to 
canvas the city by limiting its advertising time on the two city television channels 
to two hours and preventing ads on the subway. (12) Sergei Obukhov, a CPRF 
representative in the State Duma, echoed Melnikov’s accusations, claiming that 
Moscow authorities are trying to remove all mention of opposition candidates 
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after 68 billboards paid for by CPRF-supporting newspaper Pravda were put up 
around the city and removed less than 24 hours later. The billboards, which read, 
“Are you living or surviving in this city? Look the truth in the eye!” were removed 
after city hall requested half the space for ‘social advertising’ and claimed that the 
other half of the billboards needed repair. Today, many of the billboards now 
sport United Russia ads, the rest carry “available for rent” signs. (13) 
 
Moscow’s City Duma has long been a significant force because of the city’s size 
and central position in Russian politics, but for the first time, this year’s new 
members will enjoy the additional responsibility of approving the city’s Mayor 
after a candidate wins the popular vote, (14) which might further explain why City 
Hall has been so determined to manage the current election. Beyond that, 
analysts generally view the City Duma elections as a major indicator of future 
trends in both the State Duma and the presidential elections. (15) So far, the 
current election season is proving that not much has changed since the last 
election – the same government that speaks openly of ending corruption is more 
than willing to do anything it takes to remain in power. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Nataliya Vasilyeva, “Study: Roads perfect example of Moscow corruption,” 
The Associated Press via Google, 8 Sep 09, via 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gVs 
_Wps4pbLMPjh24NRyUo1lLIkwD9AJ86M00. Last accessed 10 Sep 09. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Rose Monacelli, “Economic update: what riots?” The ISCIP Analyst, Volume 
XV, Number 15, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy, 20 
Aug 09 via http://www.bu.edu/iscip/news.shtml#domestic. Last accessed 12 Sep 
09. 
(4) Yuri Chernega, “Sociologists gave back the bribes,” Kommersant, 23 Sep 08 
via http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1030171. Last accessed 13 
Sep 09. 
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(5) "Russia's Average Bribe Triples Over Year to 27,000 Rubles," Itar-Tass via 
Alinga Consulting Group, 10 Sep 09 via 
http://www.acg.ru/english/news2.phtml?m=5748. Last accessed 13 Sep 09. 
(6) “Four Opposition Candidates Removed from Moscow Duma Election,” The 
Other Russia, 4 Sep 09 via http://www.theotherrussia.org/2009/09/04/four-
opposition-candidates-removed-from-moscow-duma-election/. Last accessed 13 
Sep 09. 
(7) “Russian Parties Say Shut Out of Moscow Duma Election,” Radio Free 
Europe / Radio Liberty, 7 Sep 09 via 
http://www.refl.org/content/Russian_Parties_Say_Shut_Out_Of_Moscow_Duma_
Election/1816678.html. Last accessed 13 Sep 09. 
(8) “Opposition Activist lists his complaints against Moscow electoral 
commission,” Text of report by Gazprom-owned, editorially independent Russian 
radio station Ekho Moskvy via BBC Monitoring, 10 Sep 09 via JRL, 2009-#169, 
11 Sep 09. 
(9) Rose Monacelli, “The real competition at Sochi,” The ISCIP Analyst, Volume 
XV, Number 10, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy, 26 
March 09 via http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol15/ed1510.shtml#domestic. Last 
accessed 13 Sep 09. 
(10) “Four Opposition Candidates Removed from Moscow Duma Election,” Ibid. 
(11) “Russian Parties Say Shut Out of Moscow Duma Election,” Ibid. 
(12) “Russian Communist Party faces obstacles in election campaign,” Interfax, 9 
Sep 09 via JRL 2009-#168, 10 Sep 09. 
(13) Natalya Krainova, “Billboards Removed Ahead of City Vote,” The Moscow 
Times, 11 Sep 09 via 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/382961/index.html. Last accessed 
13 Sep 09. 
(14) “Russian Parties Say Shut Out of Moscow Duma Election,” Ibid. 
(15) Victor Yasmann, “Russia: The Moscow City Duma Election – A Case of 
Managed Democracy,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 2 Dec 05 via 




Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Supreme Court rules on Politkovskaya 
Early in August, Anna Politkovskaya’s family filed an affidavit with Russia’s 
Supreme Court. The document argued that any further judicial proceedings in the 
case should be suspended until such time as the assassination’s mastermind 
had been uncovered by proper investigation. Politkovskaya’s family and 
colleagues claim that the three individuals who were accused, tried, and 
acquitted in the case probably were merely the agents for the crime’s true 
commissioner. Their request to the Court was a response to the earlier decision 
to overturn the defendants’ acquittals and order an immediate retrial. Speaking to 
the press at the time, lawyers for the Politkovskaya family expressed the concern 
that their appeal might constitute a purely symbolic gesture: the authorities would 
create a fait accompli by failing to schedule a hearing before the beginning of a 
new trial. (1) 
 
Surprisingly, the family’s assumption was incorrect, and the Supreme Court 
heard their case during the first week in September, issuing what might be 
termed a split-judgment. First, the panel upheld the annulment of the original 
verdict. Although this was not unexpected—Murad Musayev, attorney for the 
defendants noted that the Judges had not even requested full documentary 
disclosure for this question (2)—it constituted a victory of sorts for prosecutors, 
who had argued effectively that a flawed jury was somehow to blame for the not-
guilty decision. The second part of the Supreme Court’s decision however, 
favored Politkovskaya’s family. The panel ruled that no retrial should occur, at 
least for now. Instead of a retrial, the case has been sent back to the Prosecutor 
General’s Office, (3) which has been enjoined to “merge” a new investigation of 
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the three accused with those against the alleged trigger-man (Rustam 
Makhmudov) and the mastermind. (4) 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision has been welcomed—albeit cautiously—by those 
connected to Politkovskaya. Karina Moskalenko, one of the family’s lawyers, 
noted that a “new opportunity” now existed, but that it was “an open question” 
whether the Prosecutor General’s office would actually seize the moment and 
“answer the main questions of the case.” (5) Reporters Without Borders declared 
itself hopeful that new “facts may yet emerge,” but expressed the fear that 
Russia’s Security Forces would “block all attempts” to solve the crime. (6) Dmitriy 
Muratov, Politkovskaya’s former editor at Novaya gazeta, claimed that the 
Supreme Court had made the right decision in sending the case back to the 
Prosecutor’s Office (rather than to the Military Courts) for investigation, since the 
case would now be carried through by a “professional investigations team.” (7) 
 
Realistically, it seems naïve to believe that all the facts in the murder will be 
revealed, that the Security agencies will not assert pressures, and to believe that 
an investigation carried out by one agency rather than another will somehow 
succeed. The interesting question about this ruling is why it was made. It seems 
likely that the decision was political and came from the highest corridors of 
power. The Kremlin and the Security Services want the Politkovskaya case to go 
away. Decision-makers clearly believe—given the publicity accorded the case—
that the best way to achieve closure is to prove that Rustam Makhmudov really 
was the assassin, and to demonstrate that they have discovered the person or 
persons behind the plot. The odds are not in favor of the latter. Those individuals 
likely are the superiors of the very people carrying out and supervising the 
investigation. 
 
SVR Archives and Poland 
On 25th August, RIA Novosti carried a brief statement from Russia’s Foreign 
Intelligence Service (SVR) to the effect that SVR soon would be releasing a 
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swath of declassified documents on Soviet Polish policy between 1935 and 1945. 
The documents to be released would include transcripts of talks between the two 
states’ Security and Foreign Services, as well as those of inter-military 
discussions. (8) According to the agency’s press officer, the decision to release 
these documents was taken in order to mark the 70th anniversary of the outbreak 
of World War II, to help historians answer such vital questions as why an anti-
Hitler coalition was not formed more quickly. Not surprisingly, the documents 
chosen for release have been carefully selected: Press Spokesman Ivanov 
acknowledged that not all documents from the time period would be released. (9) 
What was notably missing was any mention of the Katyn Massacre. Russian 
authorities moved relatively swiftly to head off any questions on the matter. Yuri 
Ushakov, deputy head of the Russian Government Staff, noted on 30th August 
that “certain procedures” for declassification had been followed, and that it was 
“illogical” to challenge Moscow on the point, because no “compromise” could be 
found. (10) 
 
Moscow did not open its Polish Archives for altruistic or historic anniversary 
reasons. The announcement of declassification was timed to precede a visit to 
Poland by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, where bilateral talks on items such as 
shipping in the Kaliningrad Bay and the export of spent nuclear fuel to Russia 
were to be discussed. (11) 
 
The Polish response to the lack of Katyn documentation was predictable, with 
Prime Minister Donald Tusk assuring the national media on 27 August that he 
would address the question with his counterpart. (12) Putin responded to Tusk’s 
statement by publishing an editorial in Gazeta Wyborcza on 30 August, in which 
he argued that the “shadows of the past” should not “darken relations between” 
the two countries. Russia and Poland together, Putin wrote, must “cherish the 
memory of the victims” of the “crime” that Katyn constituted. (13) The Russian 
Premier’s conciliatory tone continued during his stay in Poland. At a joint press 
conference Tusk announced that they had reached an agreement on the creation 
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of Polish-Russian centers to study Katyn, (14) while Putin claimed that Russia 
would make its archives on the period available to Polish experts, provided 
Poland reciprocated. (15) 
 
Putin’s language was surprising. Until very recently, Russia refused to 
acknowledge the Katyn Massacre and has referred to it in dissembling and 
oblique terminology. Since 2004, Polish historians consistently have been 
refused permission to travel to Moscow for research, while much of the Russian 
national media persists with the assertion that the massacre was a Nazi crime. 
Given these facts, it is legitimate to ask why Moscow suddenly has changed its 
tune, and what the Kremlin hopes to gain by (potentially) allowing access to the 
remaining classified documents. The most likely answer is that Russia will ask for 
access to US-National Missile Defense installations in Poland and possibly for 
Polish abstention or even a negative vote when the question of Georgian 
membership in NATO is next before that body’s governing council. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 15 (20 Aug 09). 
(2) “Annulment of Not Guilty Verdict in Politkovskaya Case Upheld,” Interfax, 3 
Sept 09: OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(3) “New Inquiry Ordered into Politkovskaya’s Murder,” The Guardian, 4 Sept 09 
via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) “Court to Reopen Case of Murdered Journalist,” The Times of London, 4 Sept 
09 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) “New Inquiry Ordered in Killing of Journalist,” The New York Times, 4 Sept 09 
via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) “Reporters Without Borders Satisfied With Renewal of Politkovskaya Murder 
Probe,” 4 Sept 09, Interfax; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(7)”Editor Welcomes Court Ruling in Russian Journalist Murder Probe,” Ekho 
Moskvy Radio, 4 Sept 09; OSC Summary via World News Connection. (8) 
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“Russia Declassifies 1935-1945 Secret Polish Policy Documents,” 25 Aug 09, 
RIA Novosti News Agency, Moscow, in Russian; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(9) Ibid.  
(10) “Russian Official Urges Poland Not to Press For Katyn Papers to be 
Declassified,” Interfax, 30 Aug 09; OSC Translated Excerpt via World News 
Connection. 
(11) “Putin Seeks To Oppose Revision of WWII Results in Poland,” ITAR-TASS, 
30 Aug 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(12) “Polish Premier Will Ask Putin About Kremlin’s Attitude to WWII Crime,” 
PAP, 27 Aug 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(13) “Shadows of the Past Must Not Cloud Russia-Poland Relations-Putin,” 
ITAR-TASS, 31 Aug 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(14) “Russia, Poland to Create Joint Centers to Study Katyn Tragedy,” Interfax-
AVN Online, 1 Sept 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(15) “Russia Could Open Historical Archive for Polish Experts on Reciprocal 




Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Andrew Wallace (USAF) 
 
Arctic Sea saga – sources of speculation 
In dramatic fashion, the Russian Federation Navy recovered the hijacked vessel 
Arctic Sea on August 17 off the coast of Cape Verde and saved all fifteen 
Russian crewmembers without firing a shot. (1)  Russia’s NATO Ambassador, 
Dmitry Rogozin stated, “…the operation has been carried through successfully.  
It was done with brilliance.” (2)  The Arctic Sea, which allegedly was seized by 
pirates off the coast of Sweden on July 24, is a Russian owned, Maltese 
registered, dry-cargo vessel.  The ship was reported to be transporting a benign 
cargo of timber worth nearly $2 million from Finland to the Algerian port of Bejaia. 
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(3)  Despite the highly successful rescue by the Russian Navy, speculation 
abounds that the Arctic Sea was carrying much more than just timber.  
 
Analysts and journalist have forwarded theories that the ship carried everything 
from advanced weaponry (S-300s or X-55s) to illicit drugs.  So far, investigators 
have found only timber and cut lumber on board the vessel. (4)  Why then has 
the Arctic Sea captured the interest of the international community and sparked 
so many theories?  The main sources of speculation stem from unanswered 
questions about the hijackers’ motives, the resources Russia expended on the 
rescue, and the opaque communication strategy Russian officials have 
employed.  
 
Why would “pirates” target a Russian ship transporting timber to Algeria? (5)  
Was the motive to secure a reported $1.5 million ransom or was it to acquire an 
illegal cargo of advanced S-300 or X-55 missiles, as some have posited? (6)  So 
far, official reports do little to shed light on their motives.  Reports of the hijacking 
indicate that eight men pulled up to the Arctic Sea in the territorial waters of 
Sweden, near the island of Oland, in a small inflatable boat. (7)  The team 
boarded the ship, subdued the crew at gunpoint, and disabled the ship’s tracking 
device. (8)  The ship then continued its journey toward Algeria, notifying both the 
Belgian coast guard and British sea traffic controllers that all was well and there 
was no cause for authorities to be concerned.  
 
After passing the English Channel on July 28, the ship disappeared from radar 
and avoided satellite detection. (9)  On August 3, the insurance holder for the 
Arctic Sea reportedly received a phone call from an unknown person demanding 
a $1.5 million ransom.  According to the caller, if the demand was not met, the 
crew would be eliminated and the ship would be sunk. (10)  
 
Most experts agree that the seizure of the Arctic Sea has little in common with 
“traditional” acts of piracy or armed robbery. (11)  In an interview with Time 
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Magazine regarding the hijacked Arctic Sea, Admiral Tarmo Kouts, the European 
Union’s rapporteur on piracy and former commander of the Estonian armed 
forces stated, “As a sailor with years of experience, I can tell you that the official 
versions are not realistic.” (12)  In other reporting, an “unnamed Russian general 
close to the investigation” indicated there may have been advanced weapons (S-
300 or X-55 missiles) on board that were offered for sale by an illicit weapons 
mafia. (13)  Other reports indicate that the missiles were smuggled on board the 
ship while she was in Kaliningrad for repairs before heading to Finland. (14)  So 
far, Russian officials have categorically denied that an illegal weapons cargo was 
on board the Arctic Sea.  Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “As for S-
300 on board of the Arctic Sea…it is absolutely not true.” (15) 
 
The Russian Navy’s rescue effort in this incident also raises questions about the 
Arctic Sea’s actual cargo.  A search and recovery party consisting of at least 
three battleships, a frigate, submarines and three IL-76 transport aircraft 
constitutes a far more significant show of force than would normally be required 
to track down one cargo ship. (16)  Just the three IL-76s alone, capable of 
carrying more than 120 passengers each, would seem more than enough to 
transport eight prisoners, several crewmembers and two investigative teams 
back to Moscow. (17)  If, as Russian officials claim, S-300s were not on board 
the Arctic Sea, what justified such a significant Russian Navy rescue effort? 
 
Throughout the saga, Russian officials have been less than forthcoming 
regarding the events surrounding the Arctic Sea.  In fact, Dmitry Rogozin, 
Russia’s permanent representative to NATO, admitted that false information was 
distributed to the mass media intentionally during the operation, in order to keep 
Russian plans secret. (18)  Now that the ship has been in custody for more than 
three weeks, there has been very little official information forthcoming regarding 
the investigation, the hijackers, or the cargo.  This obscure communication 
strategy has done little to abate speculation.  
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On the diplomatic front, one day after the Arctic Sea was recovered Israel’s 
President Shimon Peres conducted two days of talks with Russian President 
Medvedev.  The major outcome of the talks was President Medvedev’s pledge to 
reconsider the sale of S-300 air defense missiles to Iran. (19)  Less than three 
weeks later on September 7, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu made a secret 
diplomatic visit to Moscow, apparently as part of a continuing effort to negate 
Russian plans to sell the S-300 missile system to Iran. (20)  Both leaders’ visits, 
along with unsubstantiated reports that Israeli’s intelligence service, Mossad, 
tipped off Russian government to the hijacking, continues to carry the debate 
forward as to what role the Arctic Sea played in this international gambit. (21) 
 
The Arctic Sea has generated much speculation and garnered significant 
notoriety in a short amount of time. Russian Foreign Mister Sergey Lavrov, in 
response to questions about rumors regarding the Arctic Sea, has promised a 
transparent investigative process that he anticipates will dispel any suggestions 
that the ship was carrying an illicit cargo. (22)  The challenge now falls on Russia 
to offer plausible explanations to these inquiries over the next several weeks.  
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Interfax, 18 Aug 09; OSCE Translated Excerpt via World News Connection. 
(3) Suspects Claim They Did Not Hijack Arctic Sea, Interfax, 28 Aug 09; OSCE 
Translated Excerpt via World News Connection. 
(4) No Other Cargo But Timber Found on Board Arctic Sea, Interfax, 8 Sep 09; 
OSCE Translated Excerpt via World News Connection. 
(5) International Maritime Organization, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships, 2008 Annual Report, 19 Mar 09, pgs 1 and 19, via 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D25550/133.pdf. 
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The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Air Force, 
Department of Defense, or the United States government. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Taking the nukes out of nuclear energy 
Driven by concerns about global warming, energy supply insecurity, and volatile 
fossil fuel prices, the world seems prepared to embark upon a second atomic 
era. The International Atomic Energy Agency foresees a doubling of global 
nuclear power capacity by 2030, from 370 GW(e) (gigawatts of electricity) 
currently installed, up to 810 GW(e). (1) It is a vision of the future that Russia is 
eager to usher into reality. However, its bid to lead the nuclear power 
renaissance puts the country at the center of a dilemma—how to separate 
civilian from military programs in countries seeking to establish nuclear 
programs? Without Russia’s full participation in implementing safeguards to 
protect sensitive nuclear enrichment technology from the start, the global non-
proliferation regime could be gravely undermined. 
 
Building on its legacy as a nuclear superpower, Russia has taken advantage of 
its technological expertise and raw uranium resources to position itself as a 
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leading supplier of fuel, technology, and equipment to the developing world. 
Starting in the 1990s, Russia’s atomic energy ministry, and later the State Atomic 
Energy Corporation, Rosatom, won contracts to build reactors in India, China, 
and Iran. (2) In the decade since, Russia has moved steadily to advance its 
share of the emerging nuclear energy market. In the past year alone, Rosatom 
launched new nuclear power projects in Bulgaria, Turkey, and Jordan, and 
signed agreements on prospective cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes with Ecuador, Egypt, Nigeria, and Ukraine. (3) 
 
As a key competitor in the nuclear power market, Russia has assumed a 
prominent role in non-proliferation schemes. Rosatom’s participation in the 
construction of a nuclear power plant at Bushehr, in Iran, serves as a key 
example. Rosatom has provided Iran with Russian technology and expertise 
together with an assured supply of low-enriched uranium for the power reactor. 
With a guarantee of nuclear fuel delivery and retrieval, Iran has no need to 
develop uranium enrichment capabilities to secure a steady fuel supply. The 
concept of separating the fuel cycle makes sense from an economic standpoint, 
both for developing countries that can ill afford the high cost of developing 
domestic enrichment facilities, and for developed countries, where uranium 
enrichment is more expensive than simply importing fuel. Russia has promoted 
its plan for an International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) to serve as a fuel 
bank from which any country that wants nuclear energy may draw, provided that 
the country agrees to forego enrichment. The IUEC could provide guaranteed 
access to fuel, while safeguarding the secrets of the fuel cycle from countries that 
would use the technology for weapons purposes, according to its proponents. (4) 
 
Russia initiated the IUEC in 2006 in collaboration with Kazakhstan. Since then, 
Ukraine, Armenia, South Korea, Finland, Belgium, and Mongolia have entered 
into negotiations to join the fuel bank based in the Russian city of Angarsk, in 
Irkutsk Oblast. (5) The IAEA is currently reviewing the project for its potential 
effectiveness at curtailing the spread of nuclear weapons technology. (6) 
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Nonetheless, the plan is contentious; Russia has declared that it will supply fuel 
only to countries that have signed the NPT, leaving India, a country that has 
already expressed interest in joining the fuel bank, ineligible. The plan is also 
risky. The IAEA would prefer that the IUEC be multilaterally owned and operated 
under the auspices of the Agency to separate the fuel bank from the political 
realm. 
 
Another security initiative undertaken by Russia is the removal of spent fuel from 
foreign reactors for reprocessing and safe disposal in Russian facilities. In the 
past year, Russia cooperated with the IAEA to retrieve nuclear waste from 
Serbia, and signed an agreement to accept spent fuel rods from a research 
reactor in Poland. (7) 
 
By creating a controlled system of nuclear fuel supply and retrieval, Russia is 
making important contributions to the international non-proliferation regime. 
However, Russia’s commitment to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
has been tainted by its simultaneous support for the nuclear ambitions of rogue 
states, most notoriously, Iran. Russia’s refusal to back stringent sanctions 
against Iran in the United Nations Security Council, and its dismissal of a US 
timetable for securing progress from Iran on ending its nuclear-enrichment 
program cast doubt on Russian efforts to check the spread of nuclear weapons. 
(8) 
 
At this critical stage in the development of nuclear technology, the opportunity for 
cooperation in the international community is real, if fleeting. The race for nuclear 
power may outstrip good intentions, leaving the world a more dangerous place. 
             
Source Notes:  
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